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Abstract. The produce industry collectively solves an extremely complicated resource allocation
problem in which risk-averse farmers grow a product whose market price is often quite unpre-
dictable. Shippers or other intermediaries shield the farmer from much of this risk, permitting
fairly ecient production. However, actual contracts between growers and shippers vary consid-
erably across commodities in the residual price risk growers face. We hypothesize that imperfect
quality measurement results in a moral hazard problem, and that idiosyncratic variation in the
price of the produce provides additional information regarding quality. As a consequence, an ef-
cient contract does not shield growers from all price risk. We examine this hypothesis for the
case of fresh-market and processing tomatoes, and conclude that unobserved quality is capable of
explaining observed variation in the price risk tomato growers face.
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1. Introduction
Producers of fruits and vegetables, especially for the fresh market, operate in an unusually risky
economic environment. While these farmers face the same sorts of production risk common to
much of agriculture, they also produce a perishable commodity whose price is subject to unusually
large ﬂuctuations. Some of this variation in prices is predictable (e.g. seasonal variation), though
much of it is not, depending instead on unforeseeable shocks to both supply and demand.
Because producers often operate at a small, specialized scale, one would expect them to be
particularly vulnerable to these sorts of risks. And indeed, there is indirect evidence that they are;
various intermediaries (shippers, processors, brokers, cooperatives) write contracts with producers
which often shield them from much production and price risk. However, such contracts seldom
shield the producer from all risk. This is somewhat surprising. In a competitive market for
intermediation, a risk neutral intermediary ought to bear all risk, as it would be costless for it
to do so.
A considerable literature in agricultural economics has examined the inﬂuence of risk on various
aspects of farm level decisions [e.g., Just (1974), Just and Zilberman (1985)]. However, less attention
has been focused on the sources or reasons for this risk. We can think of three reasons why
producers might face risk. The rst is simply that contracts may not be ecient|there may
be unexploited gains to trade in insurance between growers and intermediaries. Yet the produce
industry is astonishingly productive and ecient in other aspects, and so it seems doubtful that
contracts are grossly inecient at managing the risk faced by producers.
The second possibility is that either growers are risk neutral or that intermediaries are risk
averse. There are reasons to doubt this|it seems unlikely that small, specialized family farms
don't care about income risk, and if intermediaries aren't risk neutral, then there would seem to be
rents one could earn in what appears to be a very competitive industry. Nonetheless, suppose that
intermediaries are risk-averse, and seek to maximize the expected value of some concave function
of prots. Then an ecient contract between grower and intermediary would make the grower's
compensation depend on prots realized by the intermediary, not on prices or production.
The third possibility is that there is a moral hazard problem in the fresh produce industry. This
seems utterly plausible in the case of production risk|if an intermediary were to make payments
to the grower which depended only on acreage planted and not on harvest, the grower would have
a powerful incentive to underinvest in costly inputs and labor. However, the case seems much less
clear when we consider price risk|why don't intermediaries make a payment which depends only
on the quantity and quality of produce observed at the farmgate?
We hypothesize that the reason for price risk is that unobserved investments by the grower (e.g.,
labor eort, the costly application of fertilizers or pesticides) inﬂuence not only the quantity of
the grower's output, but also its quality. By itself, this wouldn't necessarily expose the grower
to price risk. The intermediary may be able to simply condition payments on the quality of the
produce|if he can observe it. If the intermediary is unable to observe quality directly, he may
seek to infer it; objectively by measuring a variety of attributes of the produce, and perhaps also
by more subjective means. However, if this inference is less than perfect, then the grower may well
be exposed to price risk.
Because we observe contracts which seem to expose the grower to idiosyncratic price risk, we
hypothesize that quality is not perfectly observable. In this case, standard arguments from contract
theory tell us, roughly, that variation in the compensation received by the grower should depend
only on variables which contain information regarding quality (Holmstr¨ om 1979). One set of such
variables are physical measurements of various attributes of the produce (or of a sample of the
produce); another is the price eventually paid by the consumer. When the grower's compensation
depends on price, this is evidence that quality measurement undertaken by the intermediary is
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In what follows, we investigate the hypothesis that price risk is used to motivate grower attention
to quality. We rst develop a simple model of contracting in the produce industry, and then compare
our model with actual contracts from the fresh and processing tomato industries in California.
2. Model
We consider a model in which an intermediary contracts with a risk averse grower to produce
a commodity which may vary in quality. We assume that the grower can take costly actions to
control the quality produced. If quality is observable and veriable, then we would expect the
grower's compensation to depend only on the ex ante terms of the contract, and on the ex post
quality of produce.
In order to abstract from yield risk, we assume that a grower produces a single unit of some
agricultural commodity. The grower controls the quality, q, of the commodity, but increased quality
comes only at a cost c(q) to the grower, where q is some real number. The cost function c(q)i s
denominated in the grower's utils, and is increasing, convex, and continuously dierentiable. Having
produced a commodity of quality q, the grower could choose to sell the commodity on the wholesale
market; on this market the prevailing price of the commodity is some random variable p 2 P  R.
The distribution of p is some F(pjq). We assume that the density f(pjq) exists, is strictly positive
for all p 2 P, and is a continuously dierentiable function of q. Note that, for simplicity, the
distribution of p doesn't depend on aggregate market conditions|the best way to think of p is
as some hedonic price of the characteristics q, along with some error. The grower receives some
compensation w, which he values according to some utility function U(w), assumed to be strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and continuously dierentiable.
2.1. Contracting with Full Information. Because the grower faces all the price risk in the
problem above, one might suppose there to be scope for some risk-sharing intermediary. This
intermediary could assume a number of guises; it might be a rm, a growers' cooperative, or a
futures market. For concreteness, we'll refer to the intermediary as a \shipper." Thus, we consider
a way of organizing marketing in which a shipper writes some enforceable contract with the grower
prior to planting. In the simplest version of the model, the grower and shipper agree on some level
of quality, and on some form of payment for the grower.
We imagine that in the absence of a contract with the grower, the shipper earns prots of
 2 . These prots are taken to be a random variable, and may or may not be independent of
p (which, recall, is the price received for the produce of a particular grower). We write the joint
conditional density of p and  as h(p;jq); as with the conditional density f(jq), h is asssumed
to be a continuously dierentiable function of q,w i t hh ( p;jq) > 0 for all (p;) 2 P  . Total
prots are denoted by  =  + p − w, where w is the compensation given to the grower. To
avoid imposing any articial structure on this compensation, we imagine that the shipper is free to
specify a dierent payment to the grower for every possible realization of p and ;w ed e n o t et h i s
contingent payment by w(p;).
The shipper values prots (including prots earned from dealings with the grower) according
to some increasing, weakly concave function V (). Because the shipper must induce the grower
to actually sign the contract, the expected utility of the grower if he signs the contract must be
greater than or equal to the grower's expected utility if he doesn't sign the contract. We suppose
this reservation utility to be some number U, and express this constraint by
Z
U(w(p;))h(p;jq)dpd − c(q)  U: (1)QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 3
Thus, in designing the contract, the shipper decides what level of quality she wants, and how best




[V ( + p − w(p;))]h(p;jq)dpd (2)
subject to the individual rationality constraint (1).1 The solution to this problem is rst best, and
computing expected prots over a range of possible values for U traces out the Pareto frontier of
ecient allocations for this full information environment.




where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (1).
The striking thing about equation (3) is that because  is a constant, the shipper chooses to
specify a contract in which the grower's compensation doesn't actually depend directly on the price
p; the grower's compensation depends only on U and the realized prots of the shipper.
In thinking about the risk growers face, there are two cases to consider. In the rst case, the
shipper has full information on quality, but may be risk averse. In this case, the grower will share
the risk associated with variation in the shipper's prots, but will face no additional risk associated
with variation in the price of the grower's own produce. In eect, the shipper maximizes her
utility by insuring the grower against price risk. In the second case, the shipper continues to have
full information, but is risk neutral (which in this setting means that she maximizes her expected
prots). In this case V 0() is a constant, and so from (3) the grower's compensation must also be
a constant; the grower faces no risk of any sort.
Although this model is stylized and extremely simple, the observation that the intermediary
will bear all price risk is remarkably robust. If we think about obvious directions in which one
might wish to extend this model, we see that this feature survives the addition of uncertainty
in production, whether over quality or quantity; survives more elaborate, non-separable utility
functions; and is preserved in a multi-period version of this model.
2.2. Contracting with Private Information. We need to introduce some sort of friction to
keep the shipper from insuring the grower against all idiosyncratic price risk. A promising sort
of friction is private information regarding quality choice. Suppose the grower chooses q, but the
quality of the produce can't be observed by the shipper. If the grower bears some of the price risk,
this will help to provide incentives to choose high quality.
In our second model, we capture the possibility of unobservable quality dierences by having
the shipper recommend some level of quality, and require that this choice be incentive compatible.




U(w(p;))h(p;jq)dpd − c(q): (4)
Accordingly, the shipper solves the contracting problem by maximizing equation (2) subject to (1)
and (4). Now, if the shipper oers the grower a constant compensation w, the grower will respond
by choosing the lowest possible quality of produce; this is clearly inecient. However, if the shipper
is able to only observe price, the ecient contract will typically expose the grower to a great deal
1This leaves open the question of what it is that determines the grower's reservation utility U.O n e w a y t o
determine U is to make some assumptions regarding the organization of the shipping industry. In particular, if
shippers maximize expected prots in a competitive industry, then these expected prots must be zero. Because
grower's preferences are monotone and concave, this is enough to determine a unique U.QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 4
of price risk. In particular, so long as the production problem is suitably concave and the grower is
suciently risk-averse (Jewitt 1988), any interior solution to the contracting problem will satisfy
V 0()
U0(w(p;))




where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the participation constraint (1), and  is the
multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint (4). Note that when the incentive
compatibility constraint isn't binding, then we recover the constant compensation for growers from
(3); when (4) is binding, then compensation depends on the market price via the likelihood ratio
hq(p;jq)=h(p;jq).
The intermediary may be able to increase expected prots by engaging in some sort of costly
quality measurement, and using the results of this measurement to modify the payment made to
the grower. Call this quality measurement some random variable r 2 R, and suppose that r is
governed by the joint pdf  (p;;rjq). The rst order conditions for this problem would simply
replace the likelihood ratio in (5) with the new likelihood ratio  q(p;;rjq)= (p;;rjq). In the
special case of independence between r and (p;), we can write the pdf of r as some g(rjq), so that
the conditional joint pdf of p,  and r c a nb ew r i t t e na s  ( p;;rjq)=h ( p;jq)g(rjq). In this case
equation (5) is replaced by
V 0()
U0(w(p;;r))









Quality measurement is valuable so long as there exists a compensation rule w(p;;r) which makes
at least one party strictly better o than the compensation rule w(p;). From (5), such a rule will
exist so long as the quality measure is informative; that is, so long as gq(rjq) 6=0f o rs o m eqand
some r [Holmstr¨ om (1979), Proposition 3].
3. Tomato Contracts
In this section we construct a simple example of the sort of contracting problem with private
information described above, meant to approximate the contracting problem facing fresh tomato
packer/shippers (henceforth shippers). The optimal contract which solves our stylized problem
turns out to resemble the sorts of contracts actually used by fresh tomato shippers. A small
modication to the example approximates the problem facing a canner who contracts for processing
tomatoes; this optimal contract also reproduces several interesting features of actual contracts.
3.1. A Real Fresh-Market Contract. We begin by describing a particular contract commonly
observed in the \mature green" tomato industry, known as Joint Venture Agreements (JVA). We
obtained an example of such a contract from a large California shipper. The contract species a
base payment B which depends only on information known to both parties at the time the contract
is signed. Let y denote the quantity of tomatoes produced by the grower. After receiving the
grower's crop, the shipper discards any tomatoes which are below a minimum size, are o-color, or
exhibit obvious defects. The discarded tomatoes are called \culls." We denote the number of culled
tomatoes by some function `(r;y). The shipper then markets the remaining tomatoes (y −`(r;y)),
and receives some price p, so that gross revenues for the shipper are p(y − `(r;y)). The grower's




maxf[(p + b)(y − `(r;y)) − x(y)](1 − );0g: (7)
The function x(y) is meant to cover the shipper's costs of picking, packing, hauling, and marketing.
Note that x(y) is deterministic, and specied explicitly in the contract signed before planting. The
number b is a \bonus," specied in advance and paid on every carton of tomatoes shipped. TheQUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 5
number  is a \sales commission" assessed on net sales. The shipper's ability to choose B, b, `(r;y),
x(y), and  gives her considerable ﬂexibility in specifying the contract.
It is very likely that the JVA has implicit provisions, as well as explicit ones in the written
contract. One example of an implicit provision which we know is present in the JVA has to do
with the function `(r;y). This function is not specied in the written contract, and yet we know
from discussions with the shipper that in fact considerable resources are expended on the culling
process, and that growers are aware of this. Other examples of implicit provisions include the civil
liability of each party in the event of a problem with the tomatoes downstream (having to do with,
e.g., the health consequences of pesticide residue, or bacterial contamination).
To model the JVA, we assume that the quality measurement variable r c a nt a k eo nv a l u e so f
only zero or one, and that the cull function takes the simple form
`(r;y)=
(
y if r =0 ,
0i f r =1 :
The interpretation of the cull function is that if measured quality is high, then the cull is zero;
while if measured quality is low, then some proportion  of the total yield is discarded. To focus on
the role of price risk, we hold yields xed. With these simplications, and the assumption that the
grower's net revenues are non-negative, the grower's compensation under the JVA can be rewritten
as some
0 + 2p −
(
1 + 3p if r =0
0i f r =1 ;
(8)
where the parameters i, i =0 ;1 ;2 ;3 are each nonnegative. The bonus b oered by the shipper is
roughly equal to one seventh of the average price per carton of tomatoes in recent years, and so for
illustrative purposes the bonus is set so that b is equal to one seventh of the expected price (where
the equilibrium expected price is determined from the model below). The grower's compensation
under the provisions of the observed JVA is shown in Figure 1, holding yields xed. In the gure,
the dashed lines are the grower's compensation under the actual JVA, for each of two dierent
levels of cull. The solid line is simply a 45 degree line; when the realized price and compensation lie
below the 45 degree line, the shipper makes a prot, while when realized price and compensation
lie above the 45 degree line, the shipper bears a loss. In competitive equilibrium, expected price
must equal expected compensation, and so the expected values of both price and compensation
must lie on the line segment AB in Figure 1.
Under the JVA, the sales commission  is six per cent, and so the slope of the upper line is 0.47
[(1 − )=2], indicating that the grower faces 47 per cent of the price risk when measured quality
is high. The slope of the lower line is equal to 0:47(1 − ). In Figure 1,  =0 : 44 (the manner
in which this value was chosen is described below), so that when the cull is high, the grower faces
only about 26 per cent of the price risk.
3.2. A Theoretical Fresh-Market Contract. We'd like for our model to be able to reproduce
some of the stylized features of the JVA discussed above. We construct an example assuming that
the tomato shipper is risk neutral, and that the utility of the grower is given by
U(w) − c(q)=l o g ( w )−q:
Note that here the distribution of  is immaterial, because of the assumed risk-neutrality of the
intermediary. The support of the price distribution is P =[ 0 ; p ]; the support of the quality measure
distribution is R =[ 0 ; r ]. The conditional distribution of price is permitted to be dependent onQUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 6






































Figure 1. Grower's Actual Compensation Under the JVA




p=q − p + p
 γ p+  pr
 r=q
r=q − r + r
 γ r
:
With a change of variable, it's easy to see that this distribution function is a simple generalization
of a multivariate logistic distribution. For our purposes, this distribution has a number of attractive
properties. It has compact support, which makes numerical work relatively simple. Because the
likelihood ratio  q(p;rjq)= (p;rjq) is a nondecreasing function of (p;r) for all q>0, and because
Ψ is convex for all q, the rst order approach is valid (Sinclair-Desgagn e 1994); as a consequence,
the shipper can never gain by asking the grower to randomize quality. Aside from guaranteeing
that the rst order approach is valid, these conditions have a nice interpretation in this production
context|the monotone likelihood ratio implies that expected returns (prices) are an increasing
function of quality, while the convexity of Ψ implies a sort of stochastic diminishing returns to
scale.
The conditional dependence of p on r is permitted for two reasons. First, it seems likely that
consumers' perceptions of value may be shaped in part by the grade and marketing of produce.
Second, given the logarithmic utility assumed for growers, some such dependence is necessary to
capture the interaction between p and r (reﬂected by the term 3p in (8)) which helps to determine
growers' compensation.
With the primitives of preferences and technology in hand, we again turn our attention to the
problem dened by the binding individual rationality constraint (1), the rst order conditions (6),
and the rst order conditions associated with the grower's problem (4). Because the rst orderQUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 7



































Theoretical Contract   
Expected Compensation  
Figure 2. Grower's Actual & Theoretical Compensation
approach is valid, any interior solution to these equations is unique.2 The solution to this problem
depends on seven parameters of the theoretical contract: (;p; r;γ p;γ r; p;U).3 We assume that
intermediation in the tomato industry is competitive, which determines one of these parameters.
In particular, the requirement that the intermediary's expected prots are zero means that the
grower's reservation utility U is endogenous. This leaves six free parameters in the theoretical
contract, and two in the JVA. For the JVA, these include the base payment net of the grower's
share of input costs (the intercept in Figure 1), and the cull parameter . We choose these eight
parameters so as to make the two contracts approximate each other.4
Along with the actual JVA, Figure 2 displays the grower's compensation (solid lines) under the
theoretical contract as a function of r and p, given the equilibrium choice of q. The grower's expected
compensation (before the cull is determined by r) is given by the dotted line. The point at which
the 45 degree line intersects the dotted line is the expected price/compensation pair before the
cull is known, (0:1262;0:1262). Note that expected price must be equal to expected compensation
because expected prots are zero in competitive equilibrium.
2Rather than solving this problem directly, we discretize the environment and translate the problem into a linear
program (in probabilities), as suggested by Myerson (1982) or Prescott and Townsend (1984).
3We x  p and  r at one. This is not completely innocuous (i.e., not simply a choice of numeraire), because the
quantities  p and  r help to determine the pdf of prices and measured quality. The results we report seem to be fairly
insensitive to this choice, however.
4More specically, the values of these parameters and the JVA parameters are chosen to minimize the distance
between compensation under JVA and compensation under the theoretical contract, where our distance metric is the
sum of squared deviations between the two schedules at a xed set of prices. The resulting parameter vector for the
theoretical contract, ordered as above, is (0:6965; 0:2300; 0:3982; 0:1502; 0:1225; 1:1112).QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 8
The shipper has two ways of mitigating the moral hazard problem associated with the grower's
choice of q. The use of each of these tools is evident under both the JVA and the theoretical
contract. First, the grower receives a higher compensation when the realized price is high; in this
example, both the actual and the theoretical contracts expose the grower to about 47 per cent
of the price risk when the cull is low. This level of price risk induces the grower to provide a
higher level of quality by letting him share the benets of this higher quality, in the form of higher
expected prices. Second, the shipper can attempt to measure quality directly, and oers higher
compensation when measured quality is high (cull is low). These incentives induce the grower to
produce tomatoes of high quality, despite the fact that the shipper can't observe quality directly.
It's interesting to compare this contract with the set of arrangements which would prevail if
quality were directly observable. In this rst-best world, the grower chooses a much larger q;0 . 8 4
rather than 0.42. The requirement of competitive equibrium among intermediaries means that
expected compensation must continue to be equal to expected price. When quality is observable
the risk-averse grower faces no uncertainty. Accordingly, the grower receives a compensation of
0.21 with certainty. The welfare improvement in this case is noticeable; −2:15 utils instead of
−3:09. The welfare loss associated with private information can also be measured in terms of
certainty-equivalent grower incomes. A grower under the hidden quality contract would experience
a welfare improvement equivalent to a 113 per cent increase in certain income if he could move to
the competitive full information contract described above.
3.3. Real Processing Contracts. The fresh-market contracts described above rely on the inter-
mediary's ability to observe the price at which a given grower's produce is sold. This is reasonable
in the case of fresh market produce, where the grower can often be identied even by the eventual
consumer,5 but is probably dicult for many processors. A manufacturer of tomato paste, for
example, is apt to use the produce of many growers in a given lot of paste. Accordingly, the price
at which the paste is sold reveals little about the quality chosen by the original grower.
How do actual processing contracts compare with the fresh market contract described above? The
California Tomato Growers Association (CTGA) annually provides a summary of the contracts and
terms oered by the principal processors in the state (California Tomato Growers Association 1996).
In 1996, this summary included information on the contracts oered by 26 dierent processors.
Nearly all of these contracts take a standard form, which can be written as
maxf(a + m(r))(y − d(r));0g:
The variable y is again the grower's gross tonnage, and a is a base price, negotiated in advance.
The two functions m(r)a n dd ( r ) are \premium" functions and \deduction" functions, respectively.
Premia are awarded for certain measured quality characteristics, such as a high percentage of
soluble solids, and are measured in dollars per \net ton." Deductions also depend on measured
quality characteristics. The most common characteristics which result in deductions are \material
other than tomatoes," poor color (high Agtron readings), mold, or worms. Tomatoes aicted with
any of these ﬂaws are separated from `good' tomatoes and weighed; some multiple of this weight is
subtracted from y to arrive at the net tonnage. Precisely what multiple is used typically depends
on the weight of each of the dierent ﬂaws, so that d(r) is very often a quite complicated, nonlinear
function.
3.4. Theoretical Processing Contracts. To model the market for processing tomatoes, we add
to our earlier model the requirement that that a grower's compensation be independent of realized
price. The realized price still depends on the quality choices of many growers, but these growers are
assumed to be `small' enough that the price reveals nothing regarding an individual grower's quality
5Cartons of tomatoes or other produce are usually marked by the shipper with a bar code which identies the
grower, and often the particular eld or block from whence the produce originated.QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND RISK-SHARING 9






















































Figure 3. Tomato Contracts and Grower's Preferences
choice. With this additional restriction, a grower's compensation does not, of course, depend on the
realized price (though the processor's prots do). Nonetheless, the processor would like to induce
the grower to choose high quality. Because the processor cannot observe quality, and because price
reveals nothing about an individual grower's choice of quality, the processor must rely only on
quality measurement or grading to provide incentives.
We want to compare optimal contracts in the fresh and processed tomato industry. To make
comparisons simple, we compute the optimal processing contract assuming the same preferences and
technologies estimated from the fresh market example above. As in our earlier example, we assume
that processing is competitive, so that the processor's expected prots are zero (for some empirical
evidence supporting this assumption, see Durham and Sexton (1992)). For the same parameters
given above, the processor's reliance on quality measurement is quite extreme. The quality measure
r can take on only one of two values, zero or one. The simulated processor contract, then, gives
the grower compensation of 0.467 if r = 1, and 0.053 if r =0 . 6
Figure 3 shows the processing contract, along with the full information and joint venture con-
tracts. The underlying space is the quality q chosen by the grower, along with a certainty-equivalent
compensation.7 Because the grower likes compensation and dislikes supplying quality, he prefers
points to the northwest of this graph. The (slightly) convex, upward sloping lines in the gure are
6We do some injustice to the processing contract by supposing that it relies only on the same observable quality
measures as do fresh market tomatoes. In reality, a processor typically undertakes to measure quality much more
formally than do fresh-market producers. On the other hand, fresh-market shippers could choose to take the same
measurements that processors do, but they do not; presumably the combination of a culling line and observations of
price more than make up for less intensive formal quality measurements.
7For this example, the grower's certainty equivalent is calculated as the number  such that ln()=
R
ln(w(p;r)) (p;rjq)= ( q ). Thus, the slopes of the indierence curves in Figure 3 are given by 
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grower's indierence curves, each curve corresponding to the level of utility associated with one of
the contracts discussed above. The concave function in the gure is a production frontier, which
gives the expected price for any given q.
The requirements of competitive equilibrium imply that expected compensation for the growers
should lie on the concave production frontier, whatever the contract. The certainty equivalent
compensation corresponding to expected compensation will always lie somewhat below this frontier
for risk-averse growers. The distance between the certainty-equivalent and the production frontier
in Figure 3 can be interpreted as the largest insurance premium the grower would be willing to pay
if insurance against price risk were available.
The fact that the processor cannot condition compensation on realized price aects more than
the compensation scheme itself. Faced with these weaker incentives, the grower choose a level of
quality equal to only 32 per cent of quality at the full information optimum, and receives a certainty
equivalent compensation of only 0.06.
The conventional wisdom is that produce for processing applications is often of lower quality
than produce sold on the fresh market. There may be good demand-side explanations for this
phenomenon; certainly there's no reason to require processing tomatoes to be visually appealing,
and the size of tomato may matter less than it would for the fresh market. However, the analysis
here oers an alternative, supply-side explanation for lower quality in processing|because growers'
compensation can't depend on the downstream price of the tomatoes, growers' incentives to provide
high quality produce are weaker than those for fresh-market growers. As a consequence, the average
price for processing tomatoes is lower than the price for fresh-market tomatoes; 0.08 versus 0.13 in
the simulation here.
4. Conclusion
Many farmers who market their produce under contract with an intermediary face price risk in
the sense that their compensation depends on the price paid in some downstream market. Other
farmers face no price risk, but their compensation depends on quality measurement.
In Section 2, we've developed two dierent models of contracting in the produce industry that
help us understand the variation in price risk that dierent growers face. First, we consider a
grower who signs a contract with an intermediary who can observe the costly quality decisions
made by the grower. In this full-information model, growers never face idiosyncratic price risk,
but if intermediaries are risk averse, a grower's compensation may depend on the prots of the
intermediary. Compensation will not depend directly on the idiosyncratic price fetched by the
grower's own produce. Second, we consider the contractual arrangements one might observe if
quality isn't directly observable but inﬂuences price. For this model, we show that under quite
general conditions growers' compensation will depend on price. Thus, each model produces a
dierent prediction about the amount of price risk growers should face.
In Section 3, we calculate the non-yield related risks faced by fresh-market tomato growers by
analyzing an actual contract called a \Joint Venture Agreement." Under this contract, the grower
faces at most 47 per cent of the price risk, suggesting that the fresh-market tomato industry may
be best characterized using our model of unobservable quality. We construct a simple example
using a particular family of conditional distributions related to the logistic distribution. The ex-
ample features competitive risk-neutral intermediaries and growers with logarithmic preferences
over consumption and linear preferences over quality. We then choose a preference parameter and
several parameters of the price/quality measure distribution and specify an environment in which
the optimal contract is (nearly) the same as the actual JVA contract.
The processed tomato market diers from the fresh-market tomato market in two interesting
ways. First, because processors typically blend tomatoes from many dierent growers to make
their product, these intermediaries cannot use price to draw inferences regarding the quality chosenReferences 11
by growers. Second, grower compensation in the processed tomato market doesn't depend on price.
We think that these two facts are related. We add to our computed example the feature that the
intermediary learns nothing about quality by observing price. The optimal contract in this new
environment species that grower compensation should depend only on measured quality, and not
on the realization of prices, thus replicating this feature of processing tomato contracts.
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